> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.get-rial.com/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # Mint a presigned S3 URL the client uploads bytes to > Stage 1 of the upload flow. Returns a single-use presigned PUT URL (5-minute TTL, locked to the specified `contentType`) the SPA / SDK uploads raw bytes to. Bypassing the Lambda avoids the 6 MB sync-invocation cap; the Lambda only sees the resulting `image_key` reference on stage 3 (`POST /captures`). **Auth:** the verification id in the path `:token` IS the credential (same trust model as Stripe payment-intent `client_secret`). Any caller with the token can mint an upload URL — but the URL is single-use, time-limited, and locked to a specific content-type, so a stolen URL cannot be repurposed. **Capture id assignment:** server-side, returned to the client. The same id flows back to the server on `POST /captures` via the `image_key` field (the key contains the id), keeping the dashboard's display logic deterministic. ## OpenAPI ````yaml /api-reference/openapi.json post /v1/verifications/{token}/captures/upload-url openapi: 3.1.0 info: title: rial-platform — Verifications API version: 0.1.0 description: |- # rial-platform — Verifications API HTTP control plane for the rial-platform verifications-service: creating verifications, capturing media against them, finalising cases for batch analysis, and the operator-facing dashboard. ## Audience - **Tenants** integrating rial into a claims / verification flow — use the operator-issued API key and call `POST /v1/verifications`, then send the returned `capture_url` to your end-user. - **The dashboard SPA** (`app.get-rial.com`) — same surface, authenticated via the `rial_session` cookie. - **The WhatsApp bot (rialclaw)** — signs requests with HMAC (`X-Bot-Auth`), carries the target tenant in the body. - **End-user browsers** capturing photos against a fresh verification — authenticated by possession of the path `:token` alone (the token IS the credential, see ADR-0002). ## Auth modes - `cookieSession` — `rial_session` cookie set by Google OAuth at `/v1/auth/google/callback`. Dashboard browsers. - `bearerApiKey` — `Authorization: Bearer pk_live_<…>` API key, tenant-scoped. Server-to-server integrations. - `captureToken` — possession of the verification id (`vfy_…`) in the URL path authenticates the SPA capture flow. Same trust model as Stripe payment intent client_secret. - `botHmac` — `X-Bot-Auth: ` from the WhatsApp bot. ## State machine A verification's status: `pending` → `partially_captured` → `completed` | `expired` | `failed`. State transitions emit domain events on the internal EventBridge bus; webhook events are translated from those and delivered to the tenant's configured `webhook_url` (HMAC-signed via the per-tenant `webhook-signing` secret). `pending`/`partially_captured` can also side-branch to `abandoned` — reported by the capture screen via `POST /v1/verifications/:token/progress` when the end user leaves before finishing. It is not terminal: a later capture resurrects the row to `partially_captured` like any other, and no webhook event fires for the transition. ## Conventions - Wire format is **snake_case JSON** in both directions; the service maps to camelCase internally. - Errors are `{error: {code, message, fields?}}` — `code` is the stable string SDKs branch on; `message` is human-readable English; `fields` is present only on `invalid_request` validation failures. - IDs are ULIDs with type prefixes: `vfy_`, `cap_`, `tnt_`, `walotp_`, `mlk_`. - Pagination is opaque-cursor: client passes back whatever `next_cursor` the previous page returned; absent means done. ## Out of scope here - Webhook payloads delivered to tenant URLs — those are documented separately under `docs/webhook-events.md`. This spec covers only the inbound HTTP surface, not the outbound HTTP rial → tenant calls. - Internal EventBridge events on the `rial-platform-events` bus (`verification.created`, `verification.case.completed`, …) — consumer-internal, not part of the public contract. contact: name: rial-platform team url: https://github.com/Rial-ventures-Inc/rial-platform license: name: UNLICENSED — proprietary, internal use only servers: - url: https://platform-staging.get-rial.com description: Staging (safe to hit; ANALYSIS=stub, CASE_ANALYSIS=gemini-case) - url: https://platform.get-rial.com description: Production (live tenant traffic; do not test against) security: [] tags: - name: Verifications description: >- Create, fetch, list, and finalize verifications. The core of the API — every tenant integration starts here. - name: Captures description: >- Upload media against an existing verification. Two-stage flow: mint a presigned S3 URL → PUT bytes direct to S3 → POST submit-capture with the resulting key. Hardware attestation (Cloudflare Turnstile / Apple PAT) is verified per-capture. - name: Case Analysis description: >- Batch multi-image case analysis (GET-59). Finalize a verification with a claimant narrative; the worker runs Gemini multi-image cross-reasoning and emits a structured CaseAnalysisReport. Staging-only today per ADR-002 sibling deferral. - name: Public Trial description: >- Unauthenticated trial endpoint behind `get-rial.com/trial`. Each call mints a fresh verification under the rial. tenant tagged `originChannel="wa"`, so the WA-completion worker delivers the verdict to the configured trial number. - name: Templates description: >- Publish, update, revoke and inspect link templates — the reusable capture links behind `/l/{org}/{slug}`. Callable with a secret key; each publish snapshots a versioned capture spec (GET-83). paths: /v1/verifications/{token}/captures/upload-url: post: tags: - Captures summary: Mint a presigned S3 URL the client uploads bytes to description: >- Stage 1 of the upload flow. Returns a single-use presigned PUT URL (5-minute TTL, locked to the specified `contentType`) the SPA / SDK uploads raw bytes to. Bypassing the Lambda avoids the 6 MB sync-invocation cap; the Lambda only sees the resulting `image_key` reference on stage 3 (`POST /captures`). **Auth:** the verification id in the path `:token` IS the credential (same trust model as Stripe payment-intent `client_secret`). Any caller with the token can mint an upload URL — but the URL is single-use, time-limited, and locked to a specific content-type, so a stolen URL cannot be repurposed. **Capture id assignment:** server-side, returned to the client. The same id flows back to the server on `POST /captures` via the `image_key` field (the key contains the id), keeping the dashboard's display logic deterministic. parameters: - schema: type: string pattern: ^vfy_[0-9A-HJKMNP-TV-Z]{26}$ example: vfy_01HXYZABCDEFGHJKMNPQRSTVWX required: true name: token in: path requestBody: required: true content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/RequestUploadUrlRequest' example: content_type: image/jpeg kind: image responses: '200': description: Presigned URL minted. Client PUTs bytes here next. content: application/json: schema: type: object properties: upload_url: type: string format: uri image_key: type: string capture_id: type: string expires_at: type: string format: date-time required: - upload_url - image_key - capture_id - expires_at example: upload_url: >- https://rial-platform-evidence-staging-977916686093.s3.amazonaws.com/vfy_01HXYZ/cap_01ABC?X-Amz-Signature=... image_key: >- s3://rial-platform-evidence-staging-977916686093/vfy_01HXYZ/cap_01ABC capture_id: cap_01ABCDEFGHJKMNPQRSTVWXYZ12 expires_at: '2026-05-28T13:05:00.000Z' '400': description: Invalid `content_type` or missing field. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse' example: error: code: invalid_request message: Request body failed validation '404': description: Unknown verification id. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse' example: error: code: not_found message: Resource not found security: - captureToken: [] components: schemas: RequestUploadUrlRequest: type: object properties: content_type: type: string kind: type: string enum: - image - forensic_buffer default: image required: - content_type additionalProperties: false description: >- Body for `POST /v1/verifications/:token/captures/upload-url`. The returned presigned PUT URL is single-use, 5-minute TTL, locked to the specified `contentType` — a stolen URL cannot be repurposed for a different mime. ErrorResponse: type: object properties: error: type: object properties: code: type: string message: type: string fields: type: array items: type: object properties: path: type: string message: type: string required: - path - message required: - code - message required: - error description: >- Uniform error envelope. `code` is the stable string SDKs branch on (`invalid_request`, `unauthorized`, `not_found`, `expired`, `step_full`, `unknown_step`, `steps_incomplete`, `already_finalized`, `too_many_requests`, `storage_unavailable`, `internal_error`). `fields` is only present on `invalid_request` validation failures. securitySchemes: captureToken: type: apiKey in: query name: token description: >- Possession of the verification id in the URL path (`/v1/verifications/:token/...`) authenticates the SPA capture flow. No header — the id is the credential. ULIDs are large enough that existence-by-id is not a meaningful leak. Used for `POST /captures/upload-url`, `POST /captures`, `GET /v1/verify/:token`. ````